DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: SOVIETS BOAST OF MILITARY STREMGTH

The Soviet military leadership is using the 45th anniversary of the Soviet army in a massive effort, highlighted by a speech by Marshal Malinovsky, to restore the image of Soviet military superiority over the United States. Since the fall of 1961, this image has been severely tarnished by American disclosures concerning relative military strength and, most dramatically, by the Cuban crisis.

Soviet Claims Qualified. As in the past, the more sensational Soviet claims are somewhat qualified, though Moscow probably hopes that Western press accounts of what is being said will miss these qualifications. Thus, while coming close to claiming a capacity to launch nuclear weapons from satellites, Soviet rocket force commander Biryuzov actually merely states that the "possibility" of doing so now exists. Likewise, Malinovsky's claim to "several times more missiles" than the 344 which Secretary McNamara has said the US can deliver against the USSR, actually includes Soviet IREMs and MREMs. There are several other similar examples.

Support for Cuba. Malinovsky's commitment to support for Cuba. Malinovsky's commitment to support for Cuba in case of aggression by the US does not go beyond REVIEWED BY MUSICALLY DATE (LIPE Knrushchev's previous statements, although in a political and

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psychological sense, at least, it should not be minimized. The Soviets are of course aware from their intelligence at any given point of actual US preparations for an invasion and the latest threats are undoubtedly made in relative certainty that no invasion is planned or imminent. In part, Malinovsky's warning may be designed to deter a US military response to hostile action against US reconnaissance flights over Cuba.

Const Probable Soviet Purposes. Moscow almost containly feels some need, vis-a-vis Castro, the Chinese, the US and others, to dispel any impression that the promised withdrawal of certain Soviet forces from Cuba is an act of weakness. (Sowiet media so far have been totally silent on this subject; Peiping promptly reported protoclay's White House statement.) Additionally, the bellicose Soviet statements may be designed to rebut Chinese allegations of Soviet softness toward the US, more of which may be impending in the anticipated Chinese response to recent Soviet pronouncements on the Sino-Soviet dispute.

As usual, the Soviet marshald, while making extravagant boasts, also stress the military dangers confronting the USSR and thus maintain their claims to a large portion of Soviet contents resources. The Soviet people are put on notice that military outbacks, and corresponding benefits to the civilian sector, are not in prospect.

To what extent Moscow's muscle-flexing may be related to the uncompromising Soviet stance in Geneva is difficult to devermine. In a forthcoming Research Memorandum we will examine the possibility that a more general "hardening" of the Soviet posture toward the US is underway.

